Allen, Sophie (2022) Powers and the Hard Problem of Consciousness: Conceivability, Possibility and Powers. [Preprint]

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Abstract

Do conceivability arguments work against physicalism if properties are causal powers? By considering three different ways of understanding causal powers and the modality associated with them, I will argue that most, if not all, physicalist powers theorists should not be concerned about the Conceivability Argument because its conclusion that physicalism is false does not hold in their favoured ontology. I also defend specific powers theories against some recent objections to this strategy, arguing that the conception of properties as powerful blocks Conceivability Arguments unless a rather implausible form of emergence is true.

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Item Type:	Preprint
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Allen, Sophie s.r.allen@keele.ac.uk 0000-0001-5331-2778
Keywords:	Conceivability Argument, Consciousness, Powers, Dispositions, Powerful Qualities, Modality, Actualism, Physicalism, Universals
Subjects:	General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science > Consciousness Specific Sciences > Psychology
Depositing User:	Dr Sophie Allen
Date Deposited:	28 Feb 2022 03:45
Last Modified:	28 Feb 2022 03:45
Item ID:	20248
Subjects:	General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science > Consciousness Specific Sciences > Psychology
Date:	25 February 2022
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/20248

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