Allen, Sophie (2022) Powers and the Hard Problem of Consciousness: Conceivability, Possibility and Powers. [Preprint]
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Abstract
Do conceivability arguments work against physicalism if properties are causal powers? By considering three different ways of understanding causal powers and the modality associated with them, I will argue that most, if not all, physicalist powers theorists should not be concerned about the Conceivability Argument because its conclusion that physicalism is false does not hold in their favoured ontology. I also defend specific powers theories against some recent objections to this strategy, arguing that the conception of properties as powerful blocks Conceivability Arguments unless a rather implausible form of emergence is true.
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| Item Type: | Preprint | ||||||
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| Keywords: | Conceivability Argument, Consciousness, Powers, Dispositions, Powerful Qualities, Modality, Actualism, Physicalism, Universals | ||||||
| Subjects: | General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science > Consciousness Specific Sciences > Psychology |
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| Depositing User: | Dr Sophie Allen | ||||||
| Date Deposited: | 28 Feb 2022 03:45 | ||||||
| Last Modified: | 28 Feb 2022 03:45 | ||||||
| Item ID: | 20248 | ||||||
| Subjects: | General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science > Consciousness Specific Sciences > Psychology |
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| Date: | 25 February 2022 | ||||||
| URI: | https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/20248 |
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