PhilSci Archive

An argument against Nominalism

Ferrari, Francesco Maria (2021) An argument against Nominalism. [Preprint]

This is the latest version of this item.

An_Argument_Against_Nominalism (3).pdf

Download (378kB) | Preview
An_Argument_Against_Nominalism__Synthese_ (1).pdf

Download (380kB) | Preview


Nominalism in formal ontology is still the thesis that the only acceptable domain of quantification is the first-order domain of particulars. Nominalists may assert that second-order well-formed formulas can be fully and completely interpreted within the first-order domain, thereby avoiding any ontological commitment to second-order entities, by means of an appropriate semantics called ``substitutional". In this paper I argue that the success of this strategy depends on the ability of Nominalists to maintain that identity, and equivalence relations more in general, is first-order and invariant. Firstly, I explain why Nominalists are formally bound to this first-order concept of identity. Secondly, I show that the resources needed to justify identity, a certain conception of identity invariance, are out of the nominalist's reach.

Export/Citation: EndNote | BibTeX | Dublin Core | ASCII/Text Citation (Chicago) | HTML Citation | OpenURL
Social Networking:
Share |

Item Type: Preprint
Ferrari, Francesco Mariaferrarifram@gmail.com0000-0002-1648-4180
Keywords: Formal Ontology; Extensionality; Identity; Logicality; Nominalism.
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Mathematics > Logic
Specific Sciences > Mathematics > Ontology
Depositing User: Dr. Francesco Maria Ferrari
Date Deposited: 31 Mar 2022 14:46
Last Modified: 31 Mar 2022 14:46
Item ID: 20416
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Mathematics > Logic
Specific Sciences > Mathematics > Ontology
Date: 19 November 2021

Available Versions of this Item

Monthly Views for the past 3 years

Monthly Downloads for the past 3 years

Plum Analytics

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item