Guo, Bixin (2020) Two Approaches to Reduction: A Case Study from Statistical Mechanics. [Preprint]
There is a more recent version of this item available. |
|
Text
Reduction 220330.pdf Download (431kB) | Preview |
Abstract
I argue that there are two distinct approaches to understand reduction: the ontology-first approach and the theory-first approach. Further, I argue for the significance of this distinction by demonstrating that either one or the other approach has been taken as an implicit assumption in, and has in fact shaped, our understanding of what statistical mechanics is. More specifically, I argue that the Boltzmannian framework of statistical mechanics assumes and relies on the ontology-first approach, whereas the Gibbsian framework should assume the theory-first approach.
Export/Citation: | EndNote | BibTeX | Dublin Core | ASCII/Text Citation (Chicago) | HTML Citation | OpenURL |
Social Networking: |
Item Type: | Preprint | ||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Creators: |
|
||||||
Keywords: | Reduction, Statistical mechanics | ||||||
Subjects: | General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics General Issues > Philosophers of Science Specific Sciences > Physics General Issues > Reductionism/Holism Specific Sciences > Physics > Statistical Mechanics/Thermodynamics |
||||||
Depositing User: | Bixin Guo | ||||||
Date Deposited: | 10 Apr 2022 18:36 | ||||||
Last Modified: | 10 Apr 2022 18:36 | ||||||
Item ID: | 20433 | ||||||
Subjects: | General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics General Issues > Philosophers of Science Specific Sciences > Physics General Issues > Reductionism/Holism Specific Sciences > Physics > Statistical Mechanics/Thermodynamics |
||||||
Date: | September 2020 | ||||||
URI: | https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/20433 |
Available Versions of this Item
- Two Approaches to Reduction: A Case Study from Statistical Mechanics. (deposited 10 Apr 2022 18:36) [Currently Displayed]
Monthly Views for the past 3 years
Monthly Downloads for the past 3 years
Plum Analytics
Actions (login required)
View Item |