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Reconsidering the Second Argument on the Veridicality Thesis, "Semantic Argument"

Takuto, ENOMOTO (2023) Reconsidering the Second Argument on the Veridicality Thesis, "Semantic Argument". [Preprint]

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Abstract

According to the Veridicality Thesis (VT), semantic information must encapsulate truth. Luciano Floridi's Semantic Argument (SA), the argument from semantic loss of information, is a typical argument in favor of VT. SA claims that VT can be derived using the principles assumed in information theory and philosophy of information. However, I shall show that SA cannot derive VT because (1) an essential assumption for SA is made in the wrong way, and (2) even if we assume the premises are correct, it doesn't add up unless we assume the impossible assumption of negativity of information. From the above, I conclude that Floridi's defense of VT has failed.

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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Takuto, ENOMOTOharmonica0308@gmail.com0009-0000-0251-2059
Keywords: Philosophy of Information, Semantic Information, Veridicality Thesis, Informativeness, Luciano Floridi
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Computation/Information
Depositing User: Dr. Takuto ENOMOTO
Date Deposited: 15 May 2023 12:59
Last Modified: 15 May 2023 12:59
Item ID: 22102
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Computation/Information
Date: 2023
URI: https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/22102

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