Neth, Sven (2023) Better Foundations for Subjective Probability. [Preprint]
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Abstract
How do we ascribe subjective probability? In decision theory, this question is often addressed by representation theorems, going back to Ramsey (1926), which tell us how to define or measure subjective probability by observable preferences. However, standard representation theorems make strong rationality assumptions, in particular expected utility maximization. How do we ascribe subjective probability to agents which do not satisfy these strong rationality assumptions? I present a representation theorem with weak rationality assumptions which can be used to define or measure subjective probability for partly irrational agents.
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| Item Type: | Preprint | ||||||
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| Additional Information: | Forthcoming in Australasian Journal of Philosophy | ||||||
| Keywords: | Decision Theory, Representation Theorems, Subjective Probability, Comparative Probability | ||||||
| Subjects: | General Issues > Decision Theory Specific Sciences > Economics Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics |
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| Depositing User: | Sven Neth | ||||||
| Date Deposited: | 15 Dec 2023 19:30 | ||||||
| Last Modified: | 15 Dec 2023 19:30 | ||||||
| Item ID: | 22871 | ||||||
| Subjects: | General Issues > Decision Theory Specific Sciences > Economics Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics |
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| Date: | December 2023 | ||||||
| URI: | https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/22871 |
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