Dietrich, Franz and List, Christian (2023) The impossibility of non-manipulable probability aggregation. [Preprint]

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Abstract

A probability aggregation rule assigns to each profile of probability functions across a group of individuals (representing their individual probability assignments to some propositions) a collective probability function (representing the group's probability assignment). The rule is “non-manipulable” if no group member can manipulate the collective probability for any proposition in the direction of his or her own probability by misrepresenting his or her probability function (“strategic voting”). We show that, except in trivial cases, no probability aggregation rule satisfying two mild conditions (non-dictatorship and consensus preservation) is non-manipulable.

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Item Type:	Preprint
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Dietrich, Franz List, Christian
Keywords:	Probabilistic opinion pooling, Judgment aggregation, Non-manipulability, Strategy-proofness, Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem, Impossibility theorem
Subjects:	General Issues > Decision Theory Specific Sciences > Economics Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics General Issues > Social Epistemology of Science
Depositing User:	Christian List
Date Deposited:	10 Jan 2024 14:31
Last Modified:	10 Jan 2024 14:31
Item ID:	22953
Subjects:	General Issues > Decision Theory Specific Sciences > Economics Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics General Issues > Social Epistemology of Science
Date:	27 December 2023
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/22953

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