Monton, Bradley (2005) Presentism and Quantum Gravity. [Preprint]

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Abstract

There is a philosophical tradition of arguing against presentism, the thesis that only presently existing things exist, on the basis of its incompatibility with fundamental physics. I grant that presentism is incompatible with special and general relativity, but argue that presentism is not incompatible with quantum gravity, because there are some theories of quantum gravity that utilize a fixed foliation of spacetime. I reply to various objections to this defense of presentism, and point out a flaw in Gödel’s modal argument for the ideality of time. This paper provides an interesting case study of the interplay between physics and philosophy.

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Item Type:	Preprint
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Monton, Bradley
Keywords:	constant mean curvature, fixed foliation, Mark Hinchliff, Gordon Belot, John Earman, Craig Callender, Kurt Gödel
Subjects:	Specific Sciences > Physics > Relativity Theory Specific Sciences > Physics > Quantum Mechanics Specific Sciences > Physics > Quantum Field Theory
Depositing User:	Bradley Monton
Date Deposited:	19 May 2005
Last Modified:	07 Oct 2010 15:13
Item ID:	2308
Subjects:	Specific Sciences > Physics > Relativity Theory Specific Sciences > Physics > Quantum Mechanics Specific Sciences > Physics > Quantum Field Theory
Date:	May 2005
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/2308

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• Presentism and Quantum Gravity. (deposited 26 Mar 2002)
  • Presentism and Quantum Gravity. (deposited 19 May 2005) [Currently Displayed]

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