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Presentism and Quantum Gravity

Monton, Bradley (2005) Presentism and Quantum Gravity. [Preprint]

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Abstract

There is a philosophical tradition of arguing against presentism, the thesis that only presently existing things exist, on the basis of its incompatibility with fundamental physics. I grant that presentism is incompatible with special and general relativity, but argue that presentism is not incompatible with quantum gravity, because there are some theories of quantum gravity that utilize a fixed foliation of spacetime. I reply to various objections to this defense of presentism, and point out a flaw in Gödel’s modal argument for the ideality of time. This paper provides an interesting case study of the interplay between physics and philosophy.


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Monton, Bradley
Keywords: constant mean curvature, fixed foliation, Mark Hinchliff, Gordon Belot, John Earman, Craig Callender, Kurt Gödel
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Physics > Relativity Theory
Specific Sciences > Physics > Quantum Mechanics
Specific Sciences > Physics > Quantum Field Theory
Depositing User: Bradley Monton
Date Deposited: 19 May 2005
Last Modified: 07 Oct 2010 15:13
Item ID: 2308
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Physics > Relativity Theory
Specific Sciences > Physics > Quantum Mechanics
Specific Sciences > Physics > Quantum Field Theory
Date: May 2005
URI: https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/2308

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