PhilSci Archive

Reliabilist Epistemology Meets Bounded Rationality

Dusi, Giovanni (2024) Reliabilist Epistemology Meets Bounded Rationality. [Preprint]

[img]
Preview
Text
Dusi_ReliabilistEpistemologyMeetsBoundedRationality.pdf

Download (340kB) | Preview

Abstract

Epistemic reliabilism holds that a belief is justified if and only if it is produced by a reliable or truth-conducive process. I argue that reliabilism offers an epistemology for bounded rationality. This latter concept refers to normative and descriptive accounts of real-world reasoning instead of some ideal reasoning. However, as initially formulated, reliabilism involves an absolute, context-independent assessment of rationality that does not do justice to the fact that several processes are reliable in some reasoning environments but not in others, as is widely reported in the cognitive sciences literature. I consider possible solutions to this problem. Resorting to ‘normality reliabilism’, a variant of the theory, is one; but I find it insufficient. Therefore, in addition, I propose to relativise the reliability assessment to reasoning environments. This novel version of reliabilism fits bounded rationality better than the original one does.


Export/Citation: EndNote | BibTeX | Dublin Core | ASCII/Text Citation (Chicago) | HTML Citation | OpenURL
Social Networking:
Share |

Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Dusi, GiovanniGiovanni.Dusi@uab.cat0000-0002-2132-4157
Keywords: Process reliabilism; Ecological rationality; Heuristics and biases; Normality reliabilism; Heuristics; Reasoning environments
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science
General Issues > History of Philosophy of Science
Specific Sciences > Psychology
Depositing User: Mr. Giovanni Dusi
Date Deposited: 13 Feb 2024 16:26
Last Modified: 13 Feb 2024 16:26
Item ID: 23080
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science
General Issues > History of Philosophy of Science
Specific Sciences > Psychology
Date: 6 February 2024
URI: https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/23080

Monthly Views for the past 3 years

Monthly Downloads for the past 3 years

Plum Analytics

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item