Fritts, Megan and Cabrera, Frank (2024) Modeling Action: Recasting the Causal Theory. Analytic Philosophy. ISSN 2153-960X

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Abstract

Contemporary action theory is generally concerned with giving theories of action ontology. In this paper, we make the novel proposal that the standard view in action theory—the Causal Theory of Action—should be recast as a “model”, akin to the models constructed and investigated by scientists. Such models often consist in fictional, hypothetical, or idealized structures, which are used to represent a target system indirectly via some resemblance relation. We argue that recasting the Causal Theory as a model can not only accomplish the goals of causal theorists, but also give the theory greater flexibility in responding to common objections.

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Item Type:	Published Article or Volume
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Fritts, Megan Cabrera, Frank
Subjects:	Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science > Action General Issues > Decision Theory General Issues > Explanation General Issues > Models and Idealization
Depositing User:	Frank Cabrera
Date Deposited:	07 Apr 2024 05:10
Last Modified:	07 Apr 2024 05:10
Item ID:	23266
Journal or Publication Title:	Analytic Philosophy
Publisher:	Wiley
Subjects:	Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science > Action General Issues > Decision Theory General Issues > Explanation General Issues > Models and Idealization
Date:	2024
ISSN:	2153-960X
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/23266

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