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Theoretical virtues of cognitive extension

Hvorecký, Juraj and Miłkowski, Marcin (2024) Theoretical virtues of cognitive extension. [Preprint]

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This paper argues that the extended mind approach to cognition can be distinguished from its alternatives, such as embedded cognition and distributed cognition, not only in terms of metaphysics, but also in terms of epistemology. In other words, it cannot be understood in terms of a mere verbal redefinition of cognitive processing. This is because the extended mind approach differs in its theoretical virtues compared to competing approaches to cognition. The extended mind approach is thus evaluated in terms of its theoretical virtues, both essential to empirical adequacy and those that are ideal desiderata for scientific theories. While the extended mind approach may have similar internal consistency and empirical adequacy compared to other approaches, it may be more problematic in terms of its generality and simplicity as well as unificatory properties due to the cognitive bloat and the motley crew objections.

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Item Type: Preprint
Hvorecký, Jurajjuraj@hvorecky.com0000-0003-1082-8138
Additional Information: forthcoming in "Challenges of Technological Mind"
Keywords: extended cognition; theoretical virtues; epistemic virtues; generality; distributed cognition
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science
General Issues > Explanation
Depositing User: Dr. Marcin Miłkowski
Date Deposited: 19 May 2024 12:13
Last Modified: 19 May 2024 12:13
Item ID: 23455
DOI or Unique Handle:
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science
General Issues > Explanation
Date: 2024

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