PhilSci Archive

Cumulative Advantage and the Incentive to Commit Fraud in Science

Heesen, Remco (2024) Cumulative Advantage and the Incentive to Commit Fraud in Science. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 75 (3). pp. 561-586. ISSN 1464-3537

This is the latest version of this item.

[img] Text
Heesen 2024 Cumulative Advantage and the Incentive to Commit Fraud in Science (British Journal for the Philosophy of Science).pdf - Published Version
Available under License Creative Commons Attribution Non-commercial.

Download (202kB)

Abstract

This paper investigates how the credit incentive to engage in questionable research practices (up to and including fraud) interacts with cumulative advantage, the process whereby high-status academics more easily increase their status than low-status academics. I use a mathematical model to highlight two dynamics that have not yet received much attention. First, due to cumulative advantage, questionable research practices may pay off over the course of an academic career even if they are not attractive at the level of individual publications. Second, because of the role of bottleneck moments in academic careers, questionable research practices may be selected for even if they do not provide a benefit in expectation. I also observe that, within the model, the most successful academics are the most likely to have benefited from fraud.


Export/Citation: EndNote | BibTeX | Dublin Core | ASCII/Text Citation (Chicago) | HTML Citation | OpenURL
Social Networking:
Share |

Item Type: Published Article or Volume
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Heesen, Remcor.heesen@lse.ac.uk0000-0003-3823-944X
Keywords: Philosophy of science; Credit economy; Cumulative advantage; Scientific fraud; Social epistemology; Formal epistemology
Subjects: General Issues > Computer Simulation
General Issues > Decision Theory
General Issues > Ethical Issues
General Issues > Game Theory
General Issues > Social Epistemology of Science
Depositing User: Remco Heesen
Date Deposited: 29 Aug 2024 04:04
Last Modified: 29 Aug 2024 04:04
Item ID: 23845
Journal or Publication Title: The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
Official URL: https://doi.org/10.1086/716235
DOI or Unique Handle: 10.1086/716235
Subjects: General Issues > Computer Simulation
General Issues > Decision Theory
General Issues > Ethical Issues
General Issues > Game Theory
General Issues > Social Epistemology of Science
Date: September 2024
Page Range: pp. 561-586
Volume: 75
Number: 3
ISSN: 1464-3537
URI: https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/23845

Available Versions of this Item

Monthly Views for the past 3 years

Monthly Downloads for the past 3 years

Plum Analytics

Altmetric.com

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item