Woodward, James (2024) Explanation, Truth and Structural Realism. [Preprint]
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Abstract
This paper explores some implications of the account of explanation defended in Woodward, 2003 for issues having to do with the role of truth in successful explanation. It discusses some connections between the w-account, inference to the best explanation and scientific realism. I argue that the version of realism that fits best with the w-account is a version of structural realism. The role of getting dependency relations approximately right in explanation is emphasized and contrasted with other sorts of requirements like getting fundamental ontology right.
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| Item Type: | Preprint | ||||||
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| Keywords: | explanation, scientific realism, structural realism, entity realism, "no miracles" argument | ||||||
| Subjects: | General Issues > Explanation General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism |
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| Depositing User: | Jim Woodward | ||||||
| Date Deposited: | 03 Sep 2024 13:23 | ||||||
| Last Modified: | 03 Sep 2024 13:23 | ||||||
| Item ID: | 23866 | ||||||
| Subjects: | General Issues > Explanation General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism |
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| Date: | 2 September 2024 | ||||||
| URI: | https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/23866 |
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