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What is a Theory of Neural Representation For?

Richmond, Andrew (2024) What is a Theory of Neural Representation For? [Preprint]

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Abstract

This paper asks how representational notions figure into cognitive science, especially neuroscience. Philosophers have a way of skipping over that question and going straight to another: what is neural representation? What is the property or relation that representational notions pick out? I argue that this is a mistake. Our ultimate questions, as philosophers of cognitive science, are about the function and epistemology of cognitive scientific explanations — in this case, explanations that use representational notions. To answer those questions we must understand what representational notions contribute to science: what they enable scientists to do or explain, and how. But I show that we can do this without raising traditional and vexing questions about the definition of neural representation, or the nature of a property or relation that notion picks out. Taking this approach, I defend a realist account of representational explanation that underwrites important connections between philosophy and neuroscience.


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Richmond, Andrewarichmo8@uwo.ca0000-0001-7824-7474
Keywords: Cognitive Science, Representation, Scientific Explanation, Philosophy of Science
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Neuroscience > Cognitive Neuroscience
Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science > Concepts and Representations
General Issues > Explanation
General Issues > History of Philosophy of Science
Specific Sciences > Neuroscience
General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
Depositing User: Andrew Richmond
Date Deposited: 03 Oct 2024 11:52
Last Modified: 03 Oct 2024 11:52
Item ID: 23994
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Neuroscience > Cognitive Neuroscience
Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science > Concepts and Representations
General Issues > Explanation
General Issues > History of Philosophy of Science
Specific Sciences > Neuroscience
General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
Date: 2 October 2024
URI: https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/23994

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