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Against Symmetry Fundamentalism

Lopez, Cristian (2024) Against Symmetry Fundamentalism. Erkenntnis. ISSN 0165-0106

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Abstract

Symmetry fundamentalism claims that symmetries should be taken metaphysically seriously as part of the fundamental ontology. The main aim of this paper is to bring some novel objections against this view. I make two points. The first places symmetry fundamentalism within a broader network of philosophical commitments. I claim that symmetry fundamentalism entails idealization realism which, in turn, entails the reification of further theoretical structures. This might lead to an overloaded ontology as well as open the way to criticisms from metaphysical frameworks that reject such reifications. The second point contrasts symmetry fundamentalism with the now common view that regards symmetries as stipulations guiding empirical research and theory construction. I claim that both views clash each other and cannot be held together. I finish the paper with a more positive prospect that will be developed in future work—symmetry deflationism.


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Item Type: Published Article or Volume
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Lopez, Cristiancristian.lopez@unil.ch0000-0002-2883-4037
Keywords: symmetries, ontology. fundamentalism, physics
Subjects: General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics
Specific Sciences > Physics
Specific Sciences > Physics > Symmetries/Invariances
Depositing User: Dr. Cristian Lopez
Date Deposited: 07 Jan 2025 13:34
Last Modified: 07 Jan 2025 13:34
Item ID: 24484
Journal or Publication Title: Erkenntnis
Publisher: Springer (Springer Science+Business Media B.V.)
Official URL: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10670-0...
DOI or Unique Handle: 10.1007/s10670-023-00774-4
Subjects: General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics
Specific Sciences > Physics
Specific Sciences > Physics > Symmetries/Invariances
Date: 27 January 2024
ISSN: 0165-0106
URI: https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/24484

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