Wronski, Leszek and Gyenis, Zalán and Cocchiaro, Mariangela Zoe
(2025)
Formal Consistency of the Principal Principle Revisited.
[Preprint]
Abstract
We rigorously describe the relation in which a credence function should stand to a set of chance functions in order for these to be compatible in the way mandated by the Principal Principle. This resolves an apparent contradiction in the literature, by means of providing a formal way of combining credences with modest chance functions so that the latter indeed serve as guides for the former.
Along the way we note some problematic consequences of taking admissibility to imply requirements involving probabilistic independence. We also argue, contra (Hawthorne et al., 2017), that the Principal Principle does not imply the Principal of Indifference.
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Formal Consistency of the Principal Principle Revisited. (deposited 22 Jan 2025 14:18)
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