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Formal Consistency of the Principal Principle Revisited

Wronski, Leszek and Gyenis, Zalán and Cocchiaro, Mariangela Zoe (2025) Formal Consistency of the Principal Principle Revisited. [Preprint]

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Abstract

We rigorously describe the relation in which a credence function should stand to a set of chance functions in order for these to be compatible in the way mandated by the Principal Principle. This resolves an apparent contradiction in the literature, by means of providing a formal way of combining credences with modest chance functions so that the latter indeed serve as guides for the former.

Along the way we note some problematic consequences of taking admissibility to imply requirements involving probabilistic independence. We also argue, contra (Hawthorne et al., 2017), that the Principal Principle does not imply the Principal of Indifference.


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Wronski, Leszekleszek.wronski@uj.edu.pl0000-0002-7152-4544
Gyenis, Zalángyz@renyi.hu0000-0003-2058-1255
Cocchiaro, Mariangela Zoezoe.cocchiaro@yahoo.it0000-0001-5328-325X
Additional Information: Accepted for publication in the European Journal for Philosophy of Science
Keywords: Principal Principle, chance, credence, admissibility, consistency, Principle of Indifference
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics
Depositing User: Leszek Wronski
Date Deposited: 28 Jan 2025 17:55
Last Modified: 28 Jan 2025 17:55
Item ID: 24636
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics
Date: 22 January 2025
URI: https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/24636

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