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Probabilistic Empiricism

Ruyant, Quentin and Suárez, Mauricio (2025) Probabilistic Empiricism. European Journal for Philosophy of Science. ISSN 1879-4912

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Abstract

Modal Empiricism in philosophy of science proposes to understand the possibility of modal knowledge from experience by replacing talk of possible worlds with talk of possible situations, which are coarse-grained, bounded and relative to background conditions. This allows for an induction towards objective necessity, assuming that actual situations are representative of possible ones. The main limitation of this epistemology is that it does not account for probabilistic knowledge. In this paper, we propose to extend Modal Empiricism to the probabilistic case, thus providing an inductivist epistemology for probabilistic knowledge. The key idea is that extreme probabilities, close to 1 and 0, serve as proxies for testing mild probabilities, using a principle of model combination.


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Item Type: Published Article or Volume
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Ruyant, Quentinquentin.ruyant@gmail.com
Suárez, Mauriciomsuarez@filos.ucm.es
Keywords: Empiricism Probabilities Modal epistemology Situations Modal empiricism Confirmation theory Empirical adequacy
Subjects: General Issues > Confirmation/Induction
General Issues > Models and Idealization
Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics
Depositing User: Mr. Quentin Ruyant
Date Deposited: 21 Mar 2025 13:12
Last Modified: 21 Mar 2025 13:12
Item ID: 24924
Journal or Publication Title: European Journal for Philosophy of Science
Publisher: Springer
Subjects: General Issues > Confirmation/Induction
General Issues > Models and Idealization
Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics
Date: 2025
ISSN: 1879-4912
URI: https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/24924

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