Brewer, Mark (2025) QBist Metacognition and the Limits of Computationalism: A Constraint on Genuine Artificial Consciousness. [Preprint]
![[img]](https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/style/images/fileicons/text.png) |
Text
Qbism-AI.pdf Download (61kB) |
Abstract
This paper proposes a novel constraint on artificial consciousness. The central claim
is that no artificial system can be genuinely conscious unless it instantiates a form of self-referential inference that is irreducibly perspectival and non-computable. Drawing
on Quantum Bayesianism (QBism), I argue that consciousness should be understood
as an anticipatory process grounded in subjective belief revision, not as an emergent product of computational complexity. Classical systems, however sophisticated, lack
the architecture required to support this mode of updating. I conclude that artificial consciousness demands more than computation—it demands a subject.
| Export/Citation: | EndNote | BibTeX | Dublin Core | ASCII/Text Citation (Chicago) | HTML Citation | OpenURL |
| Social Networking: |
Monthly Views for the past 3 years
Monthly Downloads for the past 3 years
Plum Analytics
Actions (login required)
 |
View Item |
![[feed]](http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/style/images/feed-icon-32x32.png){kind=icon}