Dellsén, Finnur and Norton, James
(2025)
The Epistemic Mismatch Problem: Scientific Progress and Knowledge of Approximate Truths.
[Preprint]
Abstract
Many instances of scientific progress feature the development of theories that are not fully true, but merely approximately true to various extents. Since only fully true propositions can be known, this seems to rule out the view that scientific progress consists in the accumulation of knowledge. According to Bird's Cumulative Knowledge Account of progress, however, what becomes known in such instances is a (fully true) proposition expressing that the theory in question is approximately true to some extent. We present a general challenge for this idea -- the Epistemic Mismatch Problem -- and consider various strategies by which proponents of the Cumulative Knowledge Account might respond to it. We suggest, however, that the only plausible such strategies involve giving up on aspects of the Cumulative Knowledge Account that are central to why it has seemed plausible to begin with.
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