Gao, Shan (2025) Consciousness Defies Functionalism in Many Worlds. [Preprint]

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Abstract

This paper argues that functionalism, a dominant theory in philosophy of mind, fails to adequately explain the emergence of conscious experience within the Everettian (Many-Worlds) interpretation of quantum mechanics. While the universal wavefunction contains many possible ways of decomposition, functionalism cannot account for why consciousness appears only in decohered, classical-like branches and not in other parts of the wavefunction that are equally real. This limitation holds even if those other parts do not instantiate complex functional structure. We argue that consciousness, as it is observed in many worlds, defies the predictions and explanatory resources of functionalism. Therefore, functionalism must be supplemented or replaced in order to account for the observed phenomenology.

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Item Type:	Preprint
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Gao, Shan sgao7319@uni.sydney.edu.au
Keywords:	consciousness; functionalism; quantum mechanics; many-worlds interpretation
Subjects:	Specific Sciences > Neuroscience > Cognitive Neuroscience Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science > Consciousness Specific Sciences > Physics > Quantum Mechanics
Depositing User:	Prof. Shan Gao
Date Deposited:	29 May 2025 13:09
Last Modified:	29 May 2025 13:09
Item ID:	25503
Subjects:	Specific Sciences > Neuroscience > Cognitive Neuroscience Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science > Consciousness Specific Sciences > Physics > Quantum Mechanics
Date:	29 May 2025
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/25503

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