Ackermans, Lennart B.
(2025)
Factual Difference-Making is Equivalent to a Counterfactual Theory.
[Preprint]
Abstract
In Factual Difference-Making, Holger Andreas and Mario Günther (forthcoming) propose a theory of model-relative actual causation which performs remarkably well on a number of known problematic cases. They take this to show that we should abandon our counterfactual way of thinking about causation in favour of their factual alternative. I cast doubt on this argument by offering two similar theories. First, I show that the theory of Factual Difference-Making is equivalent to a partly counterfactual theory. Second, I give a fully counterfactual theory that makes the same judgments in the scenarios discussed by Andreas and Günther.
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