Esmkhani, Reza (2025) The strengths of social constructivism: A critical dialogue with Boghossian. THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 39 (3). pp. 333-352. ISSN 2171-679X

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Abstract

This article has three purposes. First, it illustrates the strengths of social constructivism (SC) as a major thesis and its two interrelated corollaries: the “social dependency” thesis, the “communitarian” theory of meaning, and the “contingency” view of knowledge. Second, by underscoring these strengths, it will show how one can counter the anti-social critique of the kind Boghossian espouses, highlighting some genuine disagreements that cannot be resolved by appealing to the assumptions and resources that are at the heart of the matter in the first place. To this end, the following points will be discussed: (1) Boghossian misses the mark primarily by focusing his main critique not on “social dependency” but on a conceptually different doctrine, namely “relativism” (defined as the “social relativity” thesis); (2) he criticizes SC by presupposing the very “non-social” view of meaning that SC was originally proposed to attack; and (3) the logic of SC “debunks” the very epistemic system on which Boghossian relies by claiming that it is as dependent on “(historical) contingencies” as any other. Finally, some responses are offered to “rationalist” concerns, which are mainly concerned with the application of SC’s logic to its own arguments.

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Item Type:	Published Article or Volume
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Esmkhani, Reza m.r.esmkhani@gmail.com 0000-0001-5627-2206
Additional Information:	ISSN: 0495-4548 (print)
Keywords:	social constructivism, meaning, contingency, normativity, knowledge, Boghossian
Subjects:	General Issues > Conventionalism General Issues > Social Epistemology of Science
Depositing User:	Unnamed user with email theoria@ehu.es
Date Deposited:	06 Jun 2025 12:35
Last Modified:	06 Jun 2025 12:35
Item ID:	25584
Journal or Publication Title:	THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science
Publisher:	Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea / Universidad del País Vasco
Official URL:	https://ojs.ehu.eus/index.php/THEORIA/article/view...
DOI or Unique Handle:	10.1387/theoria.25981
Subjects:	General Issues > Conventionalism General Issues > Social Epistemology of Science
Date:	2025
Page Range:	pp. 333-352
Volume:	39
Number:	3
ISSN:	2171-679X
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/25584

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