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The Anthropocentric Bias of Anthropic Reasoning: A Case of Implicit Dualism

Burock, Marc (2005) The Anthropocentric Bias of Anthropic Reasoning: A Case of Implicit Dualism. [Preprint]

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Abstract

Methodological anthropic reasoning (MAR), popularized by Bostrom ([2002]), aims to correct for observation selection bias by appealing to observer-relative information. I show that MAR's inferential structure is not uniquely tied to observers but applies to any set of entities subject to selection uncertainty. By miscasting a general epistemic problem as uniquely anthropic, MAR obscures its metaphysical assumptions and bypasses established probabilistic methods. Once stripped of its observer-centric framing and functionally reduced, anthropic reasoning collapses into ad hoc inference—forcing a choice: either acknowledge the metaphysical specialness of observers or concede there is no reason to privilege one physical pattern over another.

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Item Type: Preprint
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Burock, Marcburocksmail@gmail.com
Keywords: Anthropic Bias, Anthropic Reasoning, Self-Location, Probability Puzzles, Anthropic Principle, Length-Bias Sampling
Subjects: General Issues > Evidence
Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics
General Issues > Thought Experiments
Depositing User: Marc Burock
Date Deposited: 10 Jun 2025 19:16
Last Modified: 10 Jun 2025 19:16
Item ID: 25646
Subjects: General Issues > Evidence
Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics
General Issues > Thought Experiments
Date: 9 June 2005
URI: https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/25646

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