Linford, Daniel (2025) Without microphysical causation, just anything cannot begin to exist just anywhere. [Preprint]
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Abstract
According to the Causal Principle, anything that begins to exist has a cause. In turn, various authors -- including Thomas Hobbes, Jonathan Edwards, and Arthur Prior -- have defended the thesis that, had the Causal Principle been false, there would be no good explanation for why entities do not begin at arbitrary times, in arbitrary spatial locations, in arbitrary number, or of arbitrary kind. I call this the Hobbes-Edwards-Prior Principle (HEPP). However, according to a view popular among both philosophers of physics and naturalistic metaphysicians -- Neo-Russellianism -- causation is absent from fundamental physics. I argue that objections based on the HEPP should have no dialectical force for Neo-Russellians. While Neo-Russellians maintain that there is no causation in fundamental physics, they also have good reason to reject the HEPP.
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| Item Type: | Preprint | ||||||
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| Keywords: | causation; philosophy of physics; Neo-Russellianism; Causal Principle; fundamental laws; laws of nature; natural necessity | ||||||
| Subjects: | General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics General Issues > Causation General Issues > Determinism/Indeterminism General Issues > Explanation General Issues > Laws of Nature Specific Sciences > Physics |
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| Depositing User: | Dr. Daniel Linford | ||||||
| Date Deposited: | 16 Jul 2025 14:11 | ||||||
| Last Modified: | 16 Jul 2025 14:11 | ||||||
| Item ID: | 25962 | ||||||
| Subjects: | General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics General Issues > Causation General Issues > Determinism/Indeterminism General Issues > Explanation General Issues > Laws of Nature Specific Sciences > Physics |
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| Date: | 2025 | ||||||
| URI: | https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/25962 |
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