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Science as Intuition Pump: Dennett’s Methodological Legacy for Philosophy

Williams, Jag and Barwich, Ann-Sophie (2025) Science as Intuition Pump: Dennett’s Methodological Legacy for Philosophy. Philosophical Psychology. ISSN 0951-5089

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Abstract

We take a fresh look at Daniel Dennett’s naturalist legacy in philosophy, focusing on his rethinking of philosophical methods. Critics sometimes mistake Dennett for promoting a crude naturalism or dismissing philosophical tools like first-person intuition. We present his approach as more methodologically radical, blending science and philosophy in a way that treats inquiry as an evolving process. Concepts and intuitions are tested and adjusted in light of empirical findings and broader epistemic aims. For Dennett, science isn’t a limitation on philosophy, but a tool that sharpens it, with empirical data helping to refine our understanding both of concepts and philosophical phenomena alike. By exploring Dennett’s methodological contributions, we underscore the ongoing importance of his naturalist perspective in today’s philosophical landscape.


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Item Type: Published Article or Volume
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Williams, Jagjagmwill@iu.edu
Barwich, Ann-Sophieabarwich@iu.edu0000-0003-0123-9366
Keywords: philosophical method; naturalism; intuition pumps; explication; semantics
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science
Specific Sciences > Neuroscience
General Issues > Philosophers of Science
Specific Sciences > Psychology
Depositing User: Dr. Ann-Sophie Barwich
Date Deposited: 26 Jul 2025 13:10
Last Modified: 26 Jul 2025 13:10
Item ID: 26021
Journal or Publication Title: Philosophical Psychology
Official URL: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09515...
DOI or Unique Handle: https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2025.2533883
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science
Specific Sciences > Neuroscience
General Issues > Philosophers of Science
Specific Sciences > Psychology
Date: 15 July 2025
ISSN: 0951-5089
URI: https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/26021

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