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Without microphysical causation, just anything cannot begin to exist just anywhere

Linford, Daniel (2025) Without microphysical causation, just anything cannot begin to exist just anywhere. [Preprint]

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Abstract

According to the Causal Principle, anything that begins to exist has a cause. In turn, various authors -- including Thomas Hobbes, Jonathan Edwards, and Arthur Prior -- have defended the thesis that, had the Causal Principle been false, there would be no good explanation for why entities do not begin at arbitrary times, in arbitrary spatial locations, in arbitrary number, or of arbitrary kind. I call this the Hobbes-Edwards-Prior Principle (HEPP). However, according to a view popular among both philosophers of physics and naturalistic metaphysicians -- Neo-Russellianism -- causation is absent from fundamental physics. I argue that objections based on the HEPP should have no dialectical force for Neo-Russellians. While Neo-Russellians maintain that there is no causation in fundamental physics, they also have good reason to reject the HEPP.


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Linford, Danieldlinford27@gmail.com0000-0001-8008-4969
Keywords: causation; philosophy of physics; Neo-Russellianism; Causal Principle; fundamental laws; laws of nature; natural necessity
Subjects: General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics
General Issues > Causation
General Issues > Determinism/Indeterminism
General Issues > Explanation
General Issues > Laws of Nature
Specific Sciences > Physics
Depositing User: Dr. Daniel Linford
Date Deposited: 12 Aug 2025 12:52
Last Modified: 12 Aug 2025 12:52
Item ID: 26209
Subjects: General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics
General Issues > Causation
General Issues > Determinism/Indeterminism
General Issues > Explanation
General Issues > Laws of Nature
Specific Sciences > Physics
Date: 2025
URI: https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/26209

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