Bobadilla, Hernán
(2025)
Embracing Conflict: An Agonistic Framework for the Legitimation of Non-Epistemic Values in Science.
[Preprint]
Abstract
Non-epistemic values are an inextricable component of scientific research, yet their legitimacy in specific contexts remains a contested issue. Drawing on arguments from deliberative democracy, Lusk (2021) advocates “compatibilism” as a pathway to legitimize non-epistemic values in science. Nonetheless, deliberative approaches have faced substantial criticism as a legitimating framework, especially from proponents of agonistic democracy. This paper seeks to outline an epistemic framework consistent with the core insights of agonistic democracy to legitimize non-epistemic values in science. Building on Wenman (2013), I identify three key elements in agonistic democracy: constitutive pluralism, a tragic worldview, and the value of conflict. Adopting a voluntaristic approach to epistemology, I suggest that these elements can be mapped onto the epistemic domain as: i) a form of epistemic pluralism, akin to van Bouwel’s “interactive” pluralism; ii) multiple forms of uncertainty, viz., aleatoric, epistemic, and relativistic; and iii) a form of relativism that admits critical appraisal. This leads to the articulation of what I call an “agonistic” stance, which addresses key limitations of deliberative approaches in legitimizing non-epistemic values in scientific inquiry.
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