Rubin, M (2025) Preregistration does not improve the transparent evaluation of severity in Popper’s philosophy of science or when deviations are allowed. Synthese, 206 (111). pp. 1-25. ISSN 1573-0964

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Abstract

One justification for preregistering research hypotheses, methods, and analyses is that it improves the transparent evaluation of the severity of hypothesis tests. In this article, I consider two cases in which preregistration does not improve this evaluation. First, I argue that, although preregistration may facilitate the transparent evaluation of severity in Mayo’s error statistical philosophy of science, it does not facilitate this evaluation in Popper’s theory-centric approach. To illustrate, I show that associated concerns about Type I error rate inflation are only relevant in the error statistical approach and not in a theory-centric approach. Second, I argue that a test procedure that is preregistered but that also allows deviations in its implementation (i.e., “a plan, not a prison”) does not provide a more transparent evaluation of Mayoian severity than a non-preregistered procedure. In particular, I argue that sample-based validity-enhancing deviations cause an unknown inflation of the test procedure’s Type I error rate and, consequently, an unknown reduction in its capability to license inferences severely. I conclude that preregistration does not improve the transparent evaluation of severity (a) in Popper’s philosophy of science or (b) in Mayo’s approach when deviations are allowed.

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Item Type:	Published Article or Volume
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Rubin, M Mark-Rubin@outlook.com 0000-0002-6483-8561
Keywords:	critical rationalism; error statistics; p-hacking; preregistration; Popper; severity
Subjects:	General Issues > Confirmation/Induction General Issues > Evidence General Issues > Experimentation Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics
Depositing User:	Dr Mark Rubin
Date Deposited:	28 Aug 2025 13:12
Last Modified:	28 Aug 2025 13:12
Item ID:	26389
Journal or Publication Title:	Synthese
Publisher:	Springer (Springer Science+Business Media B.V.)
Official URL:	https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-025-05191-4
DOI or Unique Handle:	10.1007/s11229-025-05191-4
Subjects:	General Issues > Confirmation/Induction General Issues > Evidence General Issues > Experimentation Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics
Date:	21 August 2025
Page Range:	pp. 1-25
Volume:	206
Number:	111
ISSN:	1573-0964
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/26389

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