Johannes, Nyström (2025) How to estimate the success chance of a scientific theory? On the no miracles argument and the base rate fallacy. European Journal for Philosophy of Science. ISSN 1879-4912

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Abstract

Colin Howson (2000) claims that the no miracles argument in favor of a realist interpretation of a scientific theory falls prey to the base rate fallacy and is therefore invalid on logical grounds. In response, Dawid and Hartmann (2018) claim that Howson only reconstructs a limited part of the argument. They argue that a more complete reconstruction of the no miracles argument takes into account the success frequency of a wider spectrum of scientific theory building, and therefore avoids the base rate fallacy. In a critical response to Dawid and Hartmann, Boge (2020) presents two challenges to their approach, both of which are designed to provide reasons for skepticism about treating observed success frequencies in science as connected to the relevant base rates. In this paper, I argue that Boge’s challenges are not effective.

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Item Type:	Published Article or Volume
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Johannes, Nyström johannes.nystrom@philosophy.su.se 0009-0005-0072-0774
Subjects:	General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
Depositing User:	Mr Johannes Nyström
Date Deposited:	03 Nov 2025 11:48
Last Modified:	03 Nov 2025 11:48
Item ID:	27102
Journal or Publication Title:	European Journal for Philosophy of Science
Publisher:	Springer
Subjects:	General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
Date:	2025
ISSN:	1879-4912
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/27102

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