Douglas, Heather
(2000)
Inductive risk and values in science.
[Preprint]
Abstract
Although epistemic values have become widely accepted as part of scientific reasoning, non-
epistemic values have been largely relegated to the “external” parts of science (the selection of hypotheses, restrictions on methodologies, and the use of scientific technologies). I argue that because of inductive risk, or the risk of error, non-epistemic values are required in science wherever non-epistemic consequences of error should be considered. Illustrated with examples from dioxin studies, I show how non-epistemic consequences of error can and should be considered in the internal stages of science: choice of methodology, characterization of data, and interpretation of results.
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