Hamlin, Colin (2025) The universal theory of structure: a fundamental ontology for ontic structural realism. [Preprint]

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Abstract

Ontic Structural Realism (OSR) holds that structure is ontologically fundamental, yet it lacks a precise metaphysical account of structure. Returning to the insight that originally motivated structural realism, I develop a new basis for OSR grounded in the metaphysical foundations of mathematics. This approach draws on the principles of ante rem structuralism and their formal axiomatizations to define Structure Theory (ST), the view that structures exist sui generis and constitute the subject matter of mathematics. ST compels OSR to confront its “collapse problem” of distinguishing physical from mathematical structure. I argue for embracing the collapse by adopting the Mathematical Universe Hypothesis (MUH), which identifies our physical universe as an ante rem structure. This yields the Universal Theory of Structure (UTS), providing a fundamental ontology of structures for both mathematical and physical reality. The theory refines OSR’s fundamentality thesis from the vague “physical reality is structural” to the metaphysically substantive “physical reality is an ante rem structure,” thereby strengthening responses to criticisms concerning representation, objecthood, and causation. The UTS also illuminates important foundational problems concerning the applicability of mathematics, the particular form of our universe, and the nature of existence. I conclude that the theory’s unifying and explanatory virtues support an inference to the best explanation.

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Item Type:	Preprint
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Hamlin, Colin colin.hamlin@gmail.com
Keywords:	Ontic structural realism, Ante rem structuralism, Mathematical universe hypothesis, Structure theory, Universal theory of structure
Subjects:	General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics General Issues > Explanation General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
Depositing User:	Mr Colin Hamlin
Date Deposited:	09 Jan 2026 16:06
Last Modified:	09 Jan 2026 16:06
Item ID:	27806
Subjects:	General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics General Issues > Explanation General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
Date:	22 December 2025
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/27806

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