Babic, Boris and Wilson, Jessica M.
(2026)
The Problem of Other AI Minds.
[Preprint]
Abstract
Are we in position to warrantedly establish whether a given artificial intelligence (AI) system is conscious? In short, can we warrantedly establish whether there is AI Consciousness (AIC)? We argue for a provisionally pessimistic answer—probably not—by attending to the traditional problem of other minds. For each of the main response strategies to this problem, we argue that even if the strategy works to establish that other humans and some non-human animals are conscious, the prospect of the strategy’s working to establish that there is AIC—and more generally, to establish whether there is AIC—is unlikely. The upshot is that there a distinctively difficult problem of other AI minds, whose lack of principled resolution is likely to undermine attempts to answer questions about the personal, moral, and agential status of AI systems.
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