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The fragmentary nature of biological individuals

Unwin Holzapfel, Cristobal (2026) The fragmentary nature of biological individuals. Biology & Philosophy, 41 (17). ISSN 1572-8404

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Abstract

Biological individuals have been at the centre of a series of persistent debates, both in philosophy and biology. Many of these discussions have developed under the assumption that biological individuals form a heterogenous kind of objects comprised by various interrelated sub-kinds, such as evolutionary and physiological individuals. In recent years, however, some works have started to question the overall status of this broad kind, including its explanatory capabilities and other seemingly defensible characteristics that earlier stages of the discussions had taken for granted. This paper follows that trail but starts from a slightly different point. I look at a series of contrasts, ambiguities, and foundational aspects of biological individuality to suggest that biological individuals are more fragmented than usually recognized.


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Item Type: Published Article or Volume
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Unwin Holzapfel, Cristobalcmunwin@uc.cl0009-0004-3222-9974
Keywords: Biological individuals · Evolutionary individuals · Physiological individuals · Living individuals · Natural kinds · Biological individuality
Depositing User: Dr Cristobal Unwin Holzapfel
Date Deposited: 02 Jun 2026 18:36
Last Modified: 02 Jun 2026 18:36
Item ID: 29860
Journal or Publication Title: Biology & Philosophy
Publisher: Springer
Official URL: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10539-0...
DOI or Unique Handle: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10539-026-10020-0
Date: 9 May 2026
Volume: 41
Number: 17
ISSN: 1572-8404
URI: https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/29860

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