List, Christian and Menzies, Peter (2008) Non-Reductive Physicalism and the Limits of the Exclusion Principle. [Preprint]
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Abstract
It is often argued that higher-level special-science properties cannot be causally efficacious since the lower-level physical properties on which they supervene are doing all the causal work. This claim is usually derived from an exclusion principle stating that if a higher-level property F supervenes on a physical property F* that is causally sufficient for a property G, then F cannot cause G. We employ an account of causation as difference-making to show that the truth or falsity of this principle is a contingent matter and derive necessary and sufficient conditions under which a version of it holds. We argue that one important instance of the principle, far from undermining non-reductive physicalism, actually supports the causal autonomy of certain higher-level properties.
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Item Type: | Preprint | |||||||||
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Keywords: | causation, non-reductive physicalism, supervenience, exclusion principle, difference-making | |||||||||
Subjects: | General Issues > Causation General Issues > Explanation Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science |
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Depositing User: | Christian List | |||||||||
Date Deposited: | 11 Nov 2008 | |||||||||
Last Modified: | 07 Oct 2010 15:17 | |||||||||
Item ID: | 4322 | |||||||||
Subjects: | General Issues > Causation General Issues > Explanation Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science |
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Date: | January 2008 | |||||||||
URI: | https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/4322 |
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