Crupi, Vincenzo and Hartmann, Stephan (2009) Formal and Empirical Methods in Philosophy of Science. [Preprint]

Preview

PDF CrupiHartmann_Methods.pdf Download (171kB)

Abstract

This essay addresses the methodology of philosophy of science and illustrates how formal and empirical methods can be fruitfully combined. Special emphasis is given to the application of experimental methods to confirmation theory and to recent work on the conjunction fallacy, a key topic in the rationality debate arising from research in cognitive psychology. Several other issue can be studied in this way. In the concluding section, a brief outline is provided of three further examples.

---

Export/Citation:

EndNote | BibTeX | Dublin Core | ASCII/Text Citation (Chicago) | HTML Citation | OpenURL

Social Networking:

Share |

---

Item Type:	Preprint
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Crupi, Vincenzo Hartmann, Stephan s.hartmann@lmu.de 0000-0001-8676-2177
Additional Information:	This paper appears in F. Stadler et al. (eds.), The Present Situation in the Philosophy of Science. Berlin: Springer.
Keywords:	Methodology of philosophy of science, formal methods, experimental philosophy, confirmation measures, conjunction fallacy
Subjects:	Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics General Issues > Confirmation/Induction Specific Sciences > Psychology Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science General Issues > Experimentation
Depositing User:	Stephan Hartmann
Date Deposited:	29 Jul 2009
Last Modified:	12 Jul 2024 17:28
Item ID:	4782
Subjects:	Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics General Issues > Confirmation/Induction Specific Sciences > Psychology Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science General Issues > Experimentation
Date:	July 2009
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/4782

Monthly Views for the past 3 years

Monthly Downloads for the past 3 years

Plum Analytics

Actions (login required)

View Item