Sytsma, Justin and Machery, Edouard (2009) Two Conceptions of Subjective Experience. [Preprint]
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Abstract
Do philosophers and ordinary people conceive of subjective experience in the same way? In this article, we argue that they do not and that the philosophical concept of phenomenal consciousness does not coincide with the folk conception. We first offer experimental support for the hypothesis that philosophers and ordinary people conceive of subjective experience in markedly different ways. We then explore experimentally the folk conception, proposing that for the folk, subjective experience is closely linked to valence. We conclude by considering the implications of our findings for a central issue in the philosophy of mind, the hard problem of consciousness.
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Item Type: | Preprint | |||||||||
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Additional Information: | Forthcoming in Philosophical Studies. | |||||||||
Subjects: | Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science General Issues > Experimentation |
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Depositing User: | Justin Sytsma | |||||||||
Date Deposited: | 13 Sep 2009 | |||||||||
Last Modified: | 07 Oct 2010 15:18 | |||||||||
Item ID: | 4888 | |||||||||
Subjects: | Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science General Issues > Experimentation |
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Date: | September 2009 | |||||||||
URI: | https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/4888 |
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