Sytsma, Justin (2010) Dennett’s Theory of the Folk Theory of Consciousness. [Preprint]
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Abstract
It is not uncommon to find assumptions being made about folk psychology in the discussions of phenomenal consciousness in philosophy of mind. In this article I consider one example, focusing on what Dan Dennett says about the “folk theory of consciousness.” I show that he holds that the folk believe that qualities like colors that we are acquainted with in ordinary perception are phenomenal qualities. Nonetheless, the shape of the folk theory is an empirical matter and in the absence of empirical investigation there is ample room for doubt. Fortunately, experimental evidence on the topic is now being produced by experimental philosophers and psychologists. This article contributes to this growing literature, presenting the results of six new studies on the folk view of colors and pains. I argue that the results indicate against Dennett’s theory of the folk theory of consciousness.
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Item Type: | Preprint | ||||||
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Additional Information: | To appear in the Journal of Consciousness Studies. | ||||||
Subjects: | Specific Sciences > Psychology Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science |
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Depositing User: | Justin Sytsma | ||||||
Date Deposited: | 31 Jan 2010 | ||||||
Last Modified: | 06 Apr 2019 02:59 | ||||||
Item ID: | 5141 | ||||||
Subjects: | Specific Sciences > Psychology Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science |
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Date: | January 2010 | ||||||
URI: | https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/5141 |
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