Griffiths, Paul (2002) Is Emotion a Natural Kind? [Preprint]
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Abstract
In <i>What Emotions Really Are: The problem of psychological categories<i> I argued that it is unlikely that all the psychological states and processes that fall under the vernacular category of emotion are sufficiently similar to one another to allow a unified scientific psychology of the emotions. In this paper I restate what I mean by natural kind and my argument for supposing that emotion is not a natural kind in this specific sense. In the following sections I discuss the two most promising proposals to reunify the emotion category: the revival of the Jamesian theory of emotion associated with the writings of Antonio Damasio and a philosophical approach to the content of emotional representations that draws on multi-level appraisal theory in psychology.
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Item Type: | Preprint | ||||||
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Keywords: | emotion natural kinds damasio somatic appraisal nussbaum appraisal theory | ||||||
Subjects: | Specific Sciences > Psychology > Evolutionary Psychology Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science Specific Sciences > Psychology |
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Depositing User: | Professor Paul Edmund Griffiths | ||||||
Date Deposited: | 19 Nov 2002 | ||||||
Last Modified: | 13 Sep 2015 15:03 | ||||||
Item ID: | 566 | ||||||
Subjects: | Specific Sciences > Psychology > Evolutionary Psychology Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science Specific Sciences > Psychology |
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Date: | November 2002 | ||||||
URI: | https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/566 |
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