Rose, David and Livengood, Jonathan and Sytsma, Justin and Machery, Edouard (2011) Deep Trouble for the Deep Self. [Preprint]

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Abstract

Chandra Sripada's (forthcoming) Deep Self Concordance Account aims to explain various asymmetries in people's judgments of intentional action. On this account, people distinguish between an agent's active and deep self; attitude attributions to the agent's deep self are then presumed to play a causal role in people's intentionality ascriptions. Two judgments are supposed to play a role in these attributions — a judgment that specifies the attitude at issue and one that indicates that the attitude is robust (Sripada and Konrath, forthcoming). In this article, we show that the Deep Self Concordance Account, as it is currently articulated, is unacceptable.

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Item Type:	Preprint
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Rose, David Livengood, Jonathan Sytsma, Justin Machery, Edouard
Additional Information:	Forthcoming in Philosophical Psychology.
Subjects:	Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science General Issues > Experimentation Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics
Depositing User:	Justin Sytsma
Date Deposited:	06 Apr 2011 01:12
Last Modified:	06 Apr 2011 01:12
Item ID:	8552
Subjects:	Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science General Issues > Experimentation Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics
Date:	March 2011
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/8552

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