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Interfering with Nomological Necessity

Schrenk, Markus (2011) Interfering with Nomological Necessity. Philosophical Quarterly, 61 (244). pp. 577-597.

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David Armstrong’s law-maker, nomological necessity (N), is a second order relational universal that holds between state of affairs types, e.g., N(F, G). With only a small proviso, nomological necessity is supposed to instantiate as the causation of its second relatum, G, whenever its first relatum, F, instantiates. — In this paper, I will show that there is some friction within this theory when we consider that causal processes can be prevented and interfered with. The above mentioned proviso is supposed to handle these case but, so I argue, it fails to do so. — The critique here presented generalises to any theory of lawhood that utilises a kind of necessitation as lawmaker. Thus, Armstrong’s case can serve as a sample for all such theories. — Plausible means of resolving the difficulties will be presented.

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Item Type: Published Article or Volume
Keywords: Armstrong, laws of nature, causation, nomological necessity, prevention and interference, exceptions, ceteris paribus
Subjects: General Issues > Causation
General Issues > Laws of Nature
Depositing User: Prof. Markus Schrenk
Date Deposited: 31 Dec 2011 16:22
Last Modified: 31 Dec 2011 16:22
Item ID: 8976
Journal or Publication Title: Philosophical Quarterly
Publisher: Wiley-Blackwell
Official URL:
Subjects: General Issues > Causation
General Issues > Laws of Nature
Date: 2011
Page Range: pp. 577-597
Volume: 61
Number: 244

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