schrenk, markus
(2010)
ANTIDOTES FOR DISPOSITIONAL ESSENTIALISM.
The Metaphysics of Powers. Their Grounding and their Manifestations..
pp. 169-181.
![[img]](https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/style/images/fileicons/application_pdf.png)  Preview |
|
PDF
Schrenk._Antidotes_for_Dispositional_Essentialism.pdf
Download (242kB)
|
Abstract
Since the mid-90s dispositionalism, the view that dispositions are irreducible, real properties, gained strength due to forceful counterexamples (finks and antidotes) that could be launched against Humean anti-dispositionalist attempts to reductively analyse dispositional predicates.
In the light of these anti-Humean successes, and in combination with ideas surrounding metaphysical necessity put forward by Kripke and Putnam, some dispositionalists felt encouraged to propose a strong anti-Humean view under the name of “Dispositional Essentialism”.
In this paper, I show that, ironically, the counterexamples dispositionalists have used against the Humean reductive analysis of dispositional predicates also prove to be problems for a strong form of dispositional essentialism that assimilates dispositionality and metaphysical necessity.
Help comes from an unlike ally—Carnapian reductions sentences—but the alliance is not unproblematic.
Monthly Views for the past 3 years
Monthly Downloads for the past 3 years
Plum Analytics
Actions (login required)
 |
View Item |
![[feed]](http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/style/images/feed-icon-32x32.png){kind=icon}