Wheeler, Gregory (2012) Objective Bayesian calibration and the problem of non-convex evidence. [Preprint]
|
PDF
calibration.pdf Download (123kB) |
Abstract
Jon Williamson's Objective Bayesian Epistemology relies upon a calibration norm to constrain credal probability by both quantitative and qualitative evidence. One role of the calibration norm is to ensure that evidence works to constrain a convex set of probability functions. This essay brings into focus a problem for Williamson's theory when qualitative evidence specifies non-convex constraints.
Export/Citation: | EndNote | BibTeX | Dublin Core | ASCII/Text Citation (Chicago) | HTML Citation | OpenURL |
Social Networking: |
Item Type: | Preprint | ||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Creators: |
|
||||||
Keywords: | Objective Bayesian epistemology, convex sets, imprecise probabilities | ||||||
Subjects: | General Issues > Confirmation/Induction General Issues > Decision Theory Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics |
||||||
Depositing User: | Gregory Wheeler | ||||||
Date Deposited: | 12 Jan 2012 16:54 | ||||||
Last Modified: | 12 Jan 2012 16:54 | ||||||
Item ID: | 8990 | ||||||
Subjects: | General Issues > Confirmation/Induction General Issues > Decision Theory Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics |
||||||
Date: | 2012 | ||||||
URI: | https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/8990 |
Monthly Views for the past 3 years
Monthly Downloads for the past 3 years
Plum Analytics
Actions (login required)
View Item |