Dawid, Richard and Hartmann, Stephan and Sprenger, Jan (2012) The No Alternatives Argument. [Preprint]

Preview

PDF NAA.pdf Download (219kB)

Abstract

Scientific theories are hard to find, and once scientists have found a theory H, they often believe that there are not many distinct alternatives to H. But is this belief justified? What should scientists believe about the number of alternatives to H, and how should they change these beliefs in the light of new evidence? These are some of the questions that we will address in this paper. We also ask under which conditions failure to find an alternative to H confirms the theory in question. This kind of reasoning (which we call the No Alternatives Argument) is frequently used in science and therefore deserves a careful philosophical analysis.

---

Export/Citation:

EndNote | BibTeX | Dublin Core | ASCII/Text Citation (Chicago) | HTML Citation | OpenURL

Social Networking:

Share |

---

Item Type:	Preprint
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Dawid, Richard richard.dawid@univie.ac.at Hartmann, Stephan s.hartmann@uvt.nl Sprenger, Jan J.Sprenger@uvt.nl
Keywords:	Confirmation theory, evidence, underdetermination
Subjects:	General Issues > Confirmation/Induction Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics General Issues > Theory/Observation
Depositing User:	Stephan Hartmann
Date Deposited:	17 Jul 2012 06:09
Last Modified:	25 Feb 2013 13:16
Item ID:	9233
Subjects:	General Issues > Confirmation/Induction Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics General Issues > Theory/Observation
Date:	2 March 2012
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/9233

Available Versions of this Item

• The No Alternatives Argument. (deposited 17 Jul 2012 06:09) [Currently Displayed]
  • The No Alternatives Argument. (deposited 25 Feb 2013 13:16)

Monthly Views for the past 3 years

Monthly Downloads for the past 3 years

Plum Analytics

Actions (login required)

View Item