Brading, Katherine and Crull, Elise (2013) Epistemic Structural Realism and Poincare's Philosophy of Science. [Preprint]

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Abstract

Recent discussions of structuralist approaches to scientific theories have stemmed primarily from Worrall's (1989), in which he defends a position (since characterized `epistemic structural realism') whose historical roots he attributes to Poincare. In the renewed debate inspired by Worrall, it is thus not uncommon to find Poincare's name associated with various structuralist positions. However, Poincare's structuralism is deeply entwined with both his conventionalism and his idealism, and in this paper we explore the nature of these dependencies. What comes out in the end is not only a clearer picture of Poincare's position regarding structuralism, but also two arguments for versions of epistemic structuralism different in kind from that given by Worrall.

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Item Type:	Preprint
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Brading, Katherine kbrading@nd.edu Crull, Elise elise.crull@gmail.com
Keywords:	structural realism Poincare
Subjects:	General Issues > History of Philosophy of Science General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism General Issues > Structure of Theories
Depositing User:	Katherine A. Brading
Date Deposited:	03 Nov 2013 16:43
Last Modified:	03 Nov 2013 16:43
Item ID:	10079
Subjects:	General Issues > History of Philosophy of Science General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism General Issues > Structure of Theories
Date:	2 November 2013
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/10079

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