Mizrahi, Moti (2013) Kuhn’s Incommensurability Thesis: What’s the Argument? [Preprint]

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Abstract

In this paper, I argue that there is neither valid deductive support nor strong inductive support for Kuhn’s incommensurability thesis. There is no valid deductive support for Kuhn’s incommensurability thesis because, from the fact that the reference of the same kind terms changes or discontinues from one theoretical framework to another, it does not necessarily follow that these two theoretical frameworks are taxonomically incommensurable. There is no strong inductive support for Kuhn’s incommensurability thesis, since there are rebutting defeaters against it in the form of episodes from the history of science that do not exhibit discontinuity and replacement, as Kuhn’s incommensurability thesis predicts, but rather continuity and supplementation. If this is correct, then there are no compelling epistemic reasons to believe that Kuhn’s incommensurability thesis is true or probable.

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Item Type:	Preprint
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Mizrahi, Moti motimizra@gmail.com
Keywords:	incommensurability; lexical taxonomy; scientific change; scientific revolution; Thomas Kuhn
Subjects:	General Issues > History of Science Case Studies General Issues > Philosophers of Science General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism General Issues > Theory Change
Depositing User:	Dr. Moti Mizrahi
Date Deposited:	10 Dec 2013 20:15
Last Modified:	10 Dec 2013 20:15
Item ID:	10125
Subjects:	General Issues > History of Science Case Studies General Issues > Philosophers of Science General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism General Issues > Theory Change
Date:	2013
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/10125

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