Bird, Alexander (2012) What can cognitive science tell us about scientific revolutions? THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 27 (3). pp. 293-321. ISSN 2171-679X

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Abstract

Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions is notable for the readiness with which
it drew on the results of cognitive psychology. These naturalistic elements were not well
received and Kuhn did not subsequently develop them in his published work. Nonetheless,
in a philosophical climate more receptive to naturalism, we are able to give a more positive
evaluation of Kuhn’s proposals. Recently, philosophers such as Nersessian, Nickles, Andersen,
Barker, and Chen have used the results of work on case-based reasoning, analogical
thinking, dynamic frames, and the like to illuminate and develop various aspects of Kuhn’s
thought in Structure. In particular this work aims to give depth to the Kuhnian concepts
of a paradigm and incommensurability. I review this work and identify two broad strands
of research. One emphasizes work on concepts; the other focusses on cognitive habits. Contrasting
these, I argue that the conceptual strand fails to be a complete account of scientific
revolutions. We need a broad approach that draws on a variety of resources in psychology
and cognitive science.

La estructura de las revoluciones científicas de Kuhn es destacable por la facilidad con
que aprovecha los resultados de la psicología cognitiva. Estos elementos naturalistas no tuvieron
una buena acogida y Kuhn no los desarrolló posteriormente en su trabajo publicado.
No obstante, desde un ambiente filosófico más receptivo hacia el naturalismo podemos ofrecer
una evaluación más positiva de las propuestas de Kuhn. Recientemente, algunos filósofos
como Nersessian, Nickles, Andersen, Barker y Chen han utilizado los resultados del trabajo
sobre el razonamiento basado en casos, el pensamiento analógico, los marcos dinámicos,
etc., para iluminar y desarrollar varios aspectos del pensamiento de Kuhn en La estructura.
En particular, este trabajo intenta dar profundidad a los conceptos kuhnianos de paradigma
e inconmensurabilidad. En este artículo examino dicho trabajo e identifico dos principales
corrientes de investigación. Una de ellas subraya el trabajo sobre conceptos y la otra se
centra en los hábitos cognitivos. Después de contrastar ambas, sostengo que la corriente
conceptual no logra ser una explicación completa de las revoluciones científicas. Necesitamos
una perspectiva amplia que aproveche una variedad de recursos de la psicología y la
ciencia cognitiva.

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Item Type:	Published Article or Volume
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Bird, Alexander
Additional Information:	ISSN: 0495-4548 (print)
Keywords:	Kuhn; cognitive science; incommensurability; analogy; naturalism; ciencia cognitiva; inconmensurabilidad; analogía; naturalismo
Depositing User:	Users 15304 not found.
Date Deposited:	09 Jan 2014 21:08
Last Modified:	09 Jan 2014 21:08
Item ID:	10196
Journal or Publication Title:	THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science
Publisher:	Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea / Universidad del País Vasco
Official URL:	http://www.ehu.es/ojs/index.php/THEORIA/article/vi...
DOI or Unique Handle:	10.1387/theoria.6391
Date:	September 2012
Page Range:	pp. 293-321
Volume:	27
Number:	3
ISSN:	2171-679X
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/10196

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