Hannikainen, Ivar
(2010)
Questioning the Causal Inheritance Principle.
THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 25 (3).
pp. 261-277.
ISSN 2171-679X
Abstract
Mental causation, though a forceful intuition embedded in our commonsense psychology, is difficult to square with the rest of commitments of physicalism about the mind. Advocates of mental causation have found solace in the causal inheritance principle, according to which the mental properties of mental states share the causal powers of their physical counterparts. In this paper, I present a variety of counterarguments to causal inheritance and conclude that the conditions for causal inheritance are stricter than what standing versions of said principle imply. In line with this, physicalism may be destined to epiphenomenalism unless multiple realizability turns out false.
Item Type: |
Published Article or Volume
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Creators: |
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Additional Information: |
ISSN: 0495-4548 (print) |
Keywords: |
causal exclusion problem; epiphenomenalism; Jaegwon Kim; mental causation; multiple realizability; Derk
Pereboom |
Depositing User: |
Users 15304 not found. |
Date Deposited: |
04 Feb 2014 23:38 |
Last Modified: |
04 Feb 2014 23:38 |
Item ID: |
10304 |
Journal or Publication Title: |
THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science |
Publisher: |
Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea / Universidad del País Vasco |
Official URL: |
http://www.ehu.es/ojs/index.php/THEORIA/article/vi... |
DOI or Unique Handle: |
10.1387/theoria.798 |
Date: |
September 2010 |
Page Range: |
pp. 261-277 |
Volume: |
25 |
Number: |
3 |
ISSN: |
2171-679X |
URI: |
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/10304 |
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