Jorba Grau, Marta
(2010)
Is There A Specific Experience of Thinking?
THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 25 (2).
pp. 187-196.
ISSN 2171-679X
Abstract
In this paper I discuss whether there is a specific experience of thinking or not. I address this question
by analysing if it is possible to reduce the phenomenal character of thinking to the phenomenal character of
sensory experiences. My purpose is to defend that there is a specific phenomenality for at least some thinking mental states. I present Husserl's theory of intentionality in the Logical Investigations as a way to defend this claim and I consider its assumptions. Then I present the case of understanding as a paradigmatic case for the phenomenal contrast argument and I defend it against two objections.
| Item Type: |
Published Article or Volume
|
| Creators: |
|
| Additional Information: |
ISSN: 0495-4548 (print) |
| Keywords: |
cognitive experience, sensory experience, intentionality, phenomenal consciousness |
| Depositing User: |
Users 15304 not found. |
| Date Deposited: |
13 Feb 2014 00:40 |
| Last Modified: |
13 Feb 2014 00:40 |
| Item ID: |
10318 |
| Journal or Publication Title: |
THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science |
| Publisher: |
Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea / Universidad del País Vasco |
| Official URL: |
http://www.ehu.es/ojs/index.php/THEORIA/article/vi... |
| DOI or Unique Handle: |
10.1387/theoria.640 |
| Date: |
June 2010 |
| Page Range: |
pp. 187-196 |
| Volume: |
25 |
| Number: |
2 |
| ISSN: |
2171-679X |
| URI: |
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/10318 |
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